Understanding how changes to local labor market conditions impact household spending and savings decisions is a central topic in labor economics. To investigate the dynamics of this relationship, we examine mortgage payment choices of homeowners who purchased property in areas that later experienced a positive shock to local economic conditions via the shale oil and gas boom. Using a large loan-level dataset with detailed information on mortgage originations and monthly payments, we find that borrowers with properties located in areas with shale oil and gas booms experienced a 6% reduction in the probability of missing a mortgage payment.
Introduction
After many years of declining crude oil production in the United States, recent technological developments have made the extraction of previously inaccessible energy resources feasible. Specifically, the advent of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing techniques have enabled the exploration and production of oil and gas from "shale" geological formations, and lead to significant new drilling activity over the past decade. Contemporaneously, widespread declines in residential housing values and sharp increases in mortgage default rates in 2007-2009 were a central component of the Great Recession. Notably, in the midst of the Great Recession, the technological innovations that enabled shale oil and gas extraction provided a catalyst for an economic "boom" to clearly specified local areas where these previously inaccessible resources could now be profitably extracted. This research focuses on how this natural resource boom impacted local residents of areas where these resources were extracted. Specifically, we examine the impact of shale oil and gas discovery on long-term residents of six geographic areas that have the geological formations that allow for shale oil and/or gas extraction, namely: Bakken, Eagle Ford, Haynesville, Marcellus, Nibabrara, and Utica.
1 We estimate the impact of the shale boom on mortgage payment activity of individuals who purchased property in one of these areas prior to the natural resource discovery. Specifically, we examine the impact of the shale boom on the probability of mortgage default during a time period where aggregate default rates nationwide were sharply increasing. For the average homeowner, their house is typically the largest asset on their household balance sheet, typically making up over two-thirds of a household's wealth (Iacoviello, 2011) . Additionally, for homeowners with outstanding mortgages, this loan is typically their largest financial obligation.
Using a di↵erence-in-di↵erences framework, we find that borrowers with properties in counties with shale oil and gas resources experience, on average, a 6% reduction in the probability of mortgage default as compared to similar mortgages in non-shale areas after the boom began. This reduction in the probability of default reaches a maximum of approximately 7%-9% in 2009, during the peak of the shale boom, and attenuates to approximately a 1%-2% di↵erence in default probabilities by the end of 2014. These results are robust to choice of control group, risk categories, alternate definitions of default, and placebo tests. Overall, our results provide evidence of a significant positive economic impact of shale oil and gas booms to long-term local residents where these natural resources are located.
Economic Impact of Oil and Gas Booms
Modern crude oil production began in 1859 with Drake Well, five miles south of Titusville, Pennsylvania and began a period of rapid growth and expansion in the oil industry (Yergin, 1999) . As people from all income ranges around the country began "pushing back the night" for the first time with inexpensive fuel that could be used for lighting homes, oil became an almost instant necessity. So began the age of oil that quickly spread throughout the world.
For almost a century the U.S. experienced consistent increases in oil production. But in 1970, this age of increasing domestic production reached its end and for the first time in U.S. history production began a period of decline that continued for the next four decades. However, over the last ten years, the oil landscape has changed both suddenly and dramatically as illustrated in Figure 1 . By 2007, after a long period of declining production in the U.S., a technological breakthrough allowed "shale" oil and gas extraction to become economically viable for the first time in history; the "shale boom" was underway.
2 Through a combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (informally referred to "fracking") the trend in oil production reversed itself and the U.S. has since experienced increases in production. By the end of 2014, the U.S. was observing crude production similar to the historic levels achieved during "peak oil" of the 1970s (EIA, 2014) .
3 There has been a growing body of work that utilizes this plausibly exogenous shock to explore a variety of economic outcomes. More generally, there is a growing literature on the economic impact of fossil fuel based shocks to economic activity; and this literature has seen a resurgence due to the recent shale boom. Black et al. (2005) examines the impact of the coal boom and subsequent bust in the 1970s and 1980s on local labor markets and finds that in addition to increases in employment in the coal sector, employment increased in non-coal sectors as well. More recently, Allcott and Keniston (2014) utilize historical oil and gas production data in the U.S. since the 1960s and find that booms increase both employment and wages of local workers, and these increases are not just restricted to the oil and gas sectors. Most recently, Feyrer et al. (2015) finds that the shale boom specifically created significant economic shocks to local labor markets. Every million dollars of oil and gas extracted is estimated to generate $243,000 in wages, $117,000 in royalty payments, and 2.49 jobs within a 100 mile radius. In total, the authors estimate that the shale boom was associated with 725,000 jobs in aggregate and a 0.5 percent decrease in the unemployment rate during the Great Recession.
Thus, shocks to both the coal and oil and gas sectors have been found to impact the local economy, not only by creating jobs within the respective fossil fuel sector but also spilling over into other sectors within the economy. This is important, because if these shocks only provide increases in employment and wages in a specific sector, and that sector makes up a relatively small share of the local economy, then it is questionable whether or not the shock will be of interest to economists who want to use these shocks to generally understand how plausibly exogenous overall shocks to employment and wages impact outcomes of interest.
Because these shocks have been shown to have economy wide labor market implications, some studies have used natural resource shocks as an instrument for local labor market conditions. Black et al. (2002) exploits the coal boom and bust in the 1970s-1980s as a shock to the value of labor market participation to test the impact of earnings on Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) payments and participation, finding a negative relationship between earnings growth and growth in the DI program. Acemoglu et al. (2013) take advantage of variation in oil prices interacted with local oil reserves to estimate the impact of rising income on health expenditures.
Additionally, there has been interest in how shale booms impact local financial conditions. Gilje (2012) treats the shale boom as a catalyst to an exogenous increase in local bank deposits and local credit supply and finds that counties with large shale booms also experience a large increase in new business establishments that are reliant on external bank financing. This e↵ect is particularly strong in counties that are dominated by small local banks. Similarly, Gilje et al. (Forthcoming) exploit the shale boom to show that bank branch networks continue to play an important role in financial integration by demonstrating that banks with branch exposure to shale booms also increase mortgage lending in non-boom counties. Vachon (2015b) exploits the Bakken oil boom in North Dakota and finds that the oil boom led to large increases in the sales and income tax bases at the local level.
There are a number studies that have specifically focused on the impact of oil and gas development on local real estate markets, but this literature has been largely focused on the negative impact of drilling wells in close proximity to residential properties. Boxall et al. (2005) examines the impact of oil and gas facilities on rural residential property values in Alberta, Canada and finds that property values are negatively correlated with the number of sour gas wells and flaring oil batteries. Using hedonic pricing models, Muehlenbachs et al. (2015) finds that groundwater-dependent homes near oil and gas wells in the Marcellus shale (located in Pennsylvania) experience decreases in housing values, while similar homes that receive water from pipes experience increases in housing values likely associated with lease payments. Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) estimate a hedonic pricing model for homes near Pittsburgh, PA (also in the Marcellus shale region) finding that homes in close proximity to wells experienced decreases in housing values. While not a study on shale specifically, Boxall et al. (2005) finds that houses located near wells emitting hydrogen sulfide (that smells like rotten eggs) had a negative impact on property values in Alberta, Canada. All of these studies that examine local real estate markets have focused primarily on the negative impact of drilling on homes in close proximity to drilling activity, the "not in my back yard" (NIMBY) mantra that is commonly used in this context.
To date there is limited work on the impact of drilling activity on housing markets beyond properties directly impacted by natural resource extraction. One notable exception to this trend is recent work by Shen et al. (2015) in examining the impact of the shale oil and gas boom on mortgage markets in Pennsylvania. The authors examine default probabilities specifically for loans within the state of Pennsylvania and find no evidence that nearby "fracking" triggers mortgage default, but do find evidence that the economic activity associated with the boom can decrease the probability of mortgage default for new mortgages that originate after the boom begins.
There are two plausible channels through which an economic boom may decrease mortgage delinquency rates. The first channel is through increased earnings and employment. A number of studies have used natural resource booms as an instrument for local earnings to test the impact of earnings on a number of outcomes such as disability program participation (Black et al., 2002) , health spending (Acemoglu et al., 2013) and labor migration (Vachon, 2015a) . The second channel is through a plausible housing price increase. Housing prices are known to be pro-cyclical (Leamer, 2008; Davis and Heathcote, 2005) . Thus, if housing values in an area are increasing, and a household finds themselves in a situation where they are unable to pay their mortgage and expect this inability to pay to extend beyond the short-term, the household with positive equity will rationally choose to sell the property instead of defaulting on the loan.
We extend the literature on the impact of natural resource booms on housing and more broadly, household financial decisions in several ways. First, instead of focusing on changes in real estate values with a hedonic pricing model like much of the previous literature (Boxall et al., 2005; Muehlenbachs et al., 2015; Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber, 2014) , we examine individual households' mortgage payment decisions, specifically focusing on the probability of mortgage default. We hypothesize that probability of mortgage default will decline for households in these areas compared to similar households in other parts of the country with no shale boom.
Second, instead of focusing on a single area that experienced a boom (Shen et al., 2015) , we take advantage of the fact that the shale boom is unique in that it impacted multiple areas across the country that happened to be located on specific geological formations. Therefore we are able to analyze the e↵ect of the boom on six clearly defined geographic areas. These shale plays include Bakken, Eagle Ford, Haynesville, Marcellus, Niobrara and Utica. We identify individual mortgages that originated in counties with shale oil and/or gas activity prior to the technology shock that enabled the profitable extraction of these resources and track their payment activity until the end of 2014, or until the mortgage is terminated. Thus, this is the most comprehensive study on the impact of shale on housing markets across di↵erent shale plays.
Finally, we employ a large detailed data set with national coverage, BlackBox Logic (BBx), which provides information on over 90 percent of the privately securitized mortgages in the U.S. which includes origination information on over 20 million unique single-family residential mortgages.
4 By using a nationwide sample of loans we can select a control group of loans that are not in geographic proximity to shale oil and gas extraction to mitigate concerns about spillover e↵ects. We observe information on individual loans at origination as well as detailed monthly payment histories of each mortgage. Therefore, we know if and when a household has missed a mortgage payment as well as the current outstanding balance on the loan. We match individual loan payments to counties that experienced increases in oil and gas activity from 2007 to 2014 compared to similar loans in similar counties across the U.S. that did not experience a shale boom.
5
4 Agency securitized loans (e.g. Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae) and loans held on lenders' balance sheets are not privately securitized and therefore not included in the data.
5 For purposes of this research, we consider post 2007 as the treatment time period consistent with EIA (2015). We observe mortgages originated as early as 2000 and follow these mortgages through termination (due to default or prepayment) or the end of 2014, whichever comes first. Due to a large drop in the oil price in 2015, the shale boom largely ended in mid-2015. Therefore, studying the time period from 2007 to 2014 is likely the most appropriate definition of the "boom" time period. We will consider the specific timing of the treatment in an alternative specification.
2 Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics
Data
We use loan-level information for properties located in the shale (treated) areas compared to properties in non-shale (control) areas; we observe characteristics about the loan and the borrower at origination as well as the time series of monthly payments until the loan is terminated. We begin to observe monthly payments after the loan is placed into a mortgage backed security.
6 A loan can leave our sample for three reasons: the loan is terminated by the lender for lack of payment (severe default, foreclosure, and/or bankruptcy), the borrower prepays the remaining balance of the mortgage (e.g. lump sum prepayment, refinancing the property, or selling the property before the mortgage is repaid in full), or the original contract period of the loan ends. To avoid the potentially confounding e↵ects of changes to the local real estate market after the beginning of the shale boom, we only include observations from loans that were originated prior to the discovery of shale oil and gas in a given area. Therefore, we are considering changes in mortgage payment activity on loans that originated before the shale boom began. Loan-level data used in our analysis is from BlackBox Logic, LLC (BBx). We observe the payment activity of these loans on properties located in the treatment areas until the end of 2014, or until the mortgage is terminated, whichever occurs 6 There is, on average, a three month lag between loan origination and securitization. 7 Detailed BBx data information is available at http://www.bbxlogic.com/data.htm. 8 We look at only first-lien loans because a first mortgage is, by and large, the biggest loan against the property. Additionally, we are unable to connect the second lien loans we may observe in our dataset to the companion first lien against that property, since all information about the loan is attached to a unique loan identifier, not a property identifier. The exclusion of second lien loans, which are typically much riskier than first lien loans, likely understates the magnitude of our results.
9 We exclude multifamily properties that are likely owned by an investor. 10 We exclude investment properties or vacation homes as these are not the focus of our analysis. 11 Prior to 2000, we do not have a su cient sample size of treated loans to observe. first, and compare them to the payment choices of loans outside of the treatment areas.
Control and Treated Areas
EIA (2015) provides a list of counties that are located within each shale play. We classify counties that are located within the Bakken, Eagle Ford, Haynesville, Marcellus, Niobrara and Utica plays as treated areas. Figure 2 shows a map of where these shale plays are located.
12 We consider all available fully-amortizing, first-lien, purchase mortgages on single family, owner-occupied properties originated between 2000 and 2006 located in these shale counties as our treatment group. In order to reduce the risk of our results being contaminated by spillover e↵ects, mortgages on properties located in counties that are in states with shale activity, but that themselves do not contain shale oil and/or gas activity were removed from the list of potential control areas. In addition, states that directly border counties with shale activity were also removed from the potential control group. 13 For our main specifications, we employ propensity score matching to identify a control group of loans based on all observable origination characteristics from the population of mortgages in non-shale areas in our sample as well as employment and average wages in the counties for which these loans are located.
14 In other words, we find a corresponding "control" loan for every loan originated in a shale area that has (a) similar mortgage characteristics and (b) is located in a county that has a similar labor force size and similar average wages. As a robustness check, we choose 20 control groups randomly sampled from the entire universe of loans that originate in the pre-shale time period.
15 As we will show, estimated treatment e↵ects are robust to di↵erent choices of control group, empirical specifications, and placebo tests.
Variables
Mortgage default is the dependent variable of interest. For robustness, we consider two alternative definitions referred to as "default" and "mild default." Mortgage default results
12
This map is based on the counties identified in EIA (2015) . The Permian region, while included in the map, was excluded from the analysis because there were not a su cient number of loans in these rural areas for analysis.
13 After applying these criteria, the potential control group comes from loans in the following twenty-nine states; AL, AZ, CA, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, ME, MI, MN, MS, MO, NV, NH, NJ, NC, OK, OR, RI, SC, TN, VT, WA, and WI.
14 County level employment and average wage data is from Census provided Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI).
15 Simply pooling all mortgages nation-wide into a sample was not possible due to computing constraints, as it includes more than 900 million remittance records.
from the borrower not paying the contractually obligated monthly payment in a timely manner. For each loan, we observe a time series of monthly payment records and therefore can observe when an individual borrower misses one or more payments. Missing a single payment could be a reflection of a short term liquidity problem, or even simply forgetfulness on the part of the borrower. However, missing more than one payment in a row is indicative of a more serious financial problem. We will consider both mortgages that are just one month behind as well as mortgages with multiple missed payments.
First, we create a binary variable for default for a given loan, i, observed in time period, t, in which default it =1 if the loan is 90 or more days delinquent at the time of observation. If the borrower later makes su cient back payments, i.e. they "catch up" on their payments, the loan can be reclassified in later periods (default it =0 ). We would expect loans in areas that experienced a shale boom to have a reduced probability of default as compared to similar mortgages in areas that have no shale discoveries. Next, we construct another binary variable for a less stringent definition of default. Instead of using 90 days delinquency as our threshold, we restrict our definition of default to mortgages that are 30 days or more delinquent, that is the borrower is one or more months behind on their mortgage payments. This is referred to as mild default.
In all specifications, we include several control variables that are standard in the real estate finance literature. First, we construct a dummy variable for the loan term to control for di↵erences in longer and shorter term loans. The most common loan terms are 30 year and 15 year mortgages. We also observe other loan terms, such as 10, 20, and 40 year loans. We create a dummy variable for loans 30 year terms or longer. Previous studies have found that compared to 30 year loans, 15 year loans have a lower probability of default (Quercia and Stegman, 1992) and we expect our results will be consistent with these earlier findings.
We also control for the type of loan; that is, whether the loan a fixed rate mortgage (FRM) or adjustable rate mortgage (ARM). In addition, we include a continuous variable for the current interest rate on each loan. By definition, for FRM loans, the interest rate is determined at origination and remains constant for the entire life of the mortgage. For ARM loans, the interest rate is adjusted during the life of the loan and therefore can vary over time for a specific loan. Typically a ARM borrower receives a rate at origination below that of a comparable fixed rate loan and the interest rate is locked in for a set, relatively short, period. At the end of the period, the interest rate resets according to a predetermined formula that is a function of current market rates. We control for initial leverage of the loan at the time of origination through the initial loan to value ratio (LTV at origination). This ratio relates the initial balance of the mortgage to the purchase price of the property. For example, a $100,000 home purchased with a $20,000 down payment and therefore a $80,000 loan would have a LTV ratio of 0.8. All else equal, we would expect loans with high LTV ratios to have an increased risk of default.
We control for di↵erences in borrower credit quality by including a continuous variable for FICO credit score at origination. These scores are a measure of borrower credit risk; specifically, FICO scores give an indication of the likelihood of a negative credit event for a borrower in the next year. Credit scores are reported in the U.S. by the three major credit bureaus, Experian, Equifax and TransUnion and typically range from a very poor score of 400 up to 850, which corresponds with a very low risk borrower. For ease of interpretation in our regression models, we scale the FICO variable by dividing the borrower's FICO score by 100. We observe the FICO score of each mortgage at origination and expect this variable is negatively associated with mortgage default as has been shown in previous literature (Mester, 1997; Demyanyk and Hemert, 2011) .
Finally, we include a series of fixed e↵ects to control for additional unobservable loan heterogeneity. We include fixed e↵ects for the month the loan is observed, the year the loan is observed, the year the loan is originated, and the servicer assigned at origination. 
Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are presented for each of the six "shale plays" and their corresponding propensity score matched control groups in Table 1 . Overall, our sample consists of 31,954 treated loans across all of the shale plays, corresponding to 1,681,336 monthly payment observations. By design the summary statistics on the origination characteristics for treated and control group are almost identical.
17 Overall, the average FICO score for our sample is 650 in the treated group and 649 in the control group. Although there is no universally accepted cuto↵ for subprime borrowers' credit scores, a commonly quoted threshold for a subprime FICO score in this period is 620, making our sample, on average, above the threshold for subprime lending. There is variation in average credit scores across the plays, ranging from an average of 629 for the treated group of loans in Haynesville to an average of 674 for the treated group of loans in Niobrara. 16 We individually control for all servicers that service 1% or more of the total volume of loans nationwide in our sample. This construction results in the creation of 18 dummy variables, one for each large servicer, accounting for over 70% of the sample. All other smaller servicers are lumped together in a single category.
17 We conduct our propensity score match on origination characteristics, so the total number of loans in both the control and treated groups are the same, but the number of payment observations is di↵erent.
Overall, the loan to value ratio for the sample is about 85% for both the treated and control groups, indicated that on average, borrowers made a 15% down payment at the point of loan origination. Loans on properties in Niobara have the lowest average LTV (82%) while loans on properties Utica has the highest (88%). Adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) make up 45.8% of our total treated population and 44.3% of the propensity score matched control group. The remainder of loans in the sample are fixed rate mortgages (FRMs). There is variation in the ARM portion of the mortgage market across our individual treated areas, ranging from 32.7% in Eagle Ford to 53.0% in Niobrara. In our sample, 30 year or longer mortgages are by far the most common loan term (96%), and this is consistent across all shale plays. Although we do not match on the loan's current interest rate when creating our sample (interest rate can vary after origination for adjustable rate loans), the current interest rate is about 7.4% to 7.5% in both the control and treated areas.
Our summary statistics for our outcomes of interest show both default and mild default is lower in the treated areas than the control areas. This is true overall as well as in five of the six shale plays. Pooled across all time periods and geographic areas, 16.3% of the treatment group observations have a severe default versus 20.3% for the control group. These di↵erences are similar in magnitude using our mild default measure; 27.7% of the treatment group observations have a mild default versus 31.4% of observations in the control group.
Of course, these summary statistics only provide a snapshot over the entire sample period from 2000 to 2014. Figure 3 illustrates the mortgage default and mild default rate in shale areas compared to the propensity score matched control groups to compare changes in the two groups before and after the shale boom began. As can be seen, the two groups have relatively similar levels of default and mild default before 2007, when the shale boom began. But after 2007, there is a divergence of default rates for loans in shale areas compared to nonshale areas. In particular, mortgages in treated areas experienced significant decreases in the probability of both mortgage default and mild default relative to control group mortgages.
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Empirical Strategy
As a first empirical test, we will consider two "cohorts" of mortgages; specifically mortgages that were originated in 2006 and those mortgages that were originated in 2005. That is the year before and two years, respectively, before the shale boom began in 2007. For each loan in a shale area, we conduct a propensity score match only from other loans nationwide that also originated within that year. These propensity scores are based on both loan characteristics at origination and county level labor market conditions in the pre-treatment time period. Specifically, loan level origination characteristics include the appraisal value of the home, LTV ratio, original interest rate, FICO score, whether the loan had a term longer or shorter than 30 years, and whether the mortgage is an ARM or FRM. County level employment and average earnings are observed in these respective years (QWI). Thus, these control mortgages originated in the same year, have similar origination characteristics, and are located in a county with a similar labor market size and average earnings.
We then observe the first occurrence, if ever, for which each mortgage experienced default (or mild default) and test whether mortgages in shale counties are less likely to have gone into default during, or before, a given year. This is illustrated in equation (1),
In this first empirical specification, we are not using the full panel of payment information. For all loans in the 2005 cohort (a total of 24,686 loans) we estimate this model for each year [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . In this specification, d
i,c is an indicator variable for whether the mortgage in county c (that is either a shale or non-shale county), has ever entered into default during or before a given year. Then, we repeat this analysis for the 28,453 loans that are in the 2006 cohort. Next, we expand this analysis to consider all mortgages originated in the 2000 to 2006 time period and utilize the full panel of payment history of each loan.
Equation (2) illustrates the commonly used di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DD) style estimation strategy used to test for the impact of shale oil and gas on mortgage default utilizing the full panel of data available.
where d i,c,t is the outcome of interest-mortgage default-for individual mortgage i in county c in month t. S Shalec is an indicator variable corresponding to counties with shale oil and/or gas activity (i.e. the treatment group) and is zero for the mortgages not located in one of the counties with shale activity. Shale t is an indicator variable that indicates the time periods after shale activity began. All of the shale plays, and therefore counties that EIA defines to have shale activity, saw increases in drilling starting around 2007 and this drilling activity continued until the end of 2014. 19 We use a logistic regression to estimate the change in the probability of default and mild default in each shale play. For ease of interpretation, we present all results as marginal e↵ects estimated at the means for each variable. For each model, we estimate standard errors clustered at the property zip code level. The vector X 0 it contains control variables that are standard in the real estate finance literature, including the term of the mortgage, whether the mortgage has a fixed or adjustable interest rate, the initial interest rate of the mortgage (that is either fixed or varies over time based on the mortgage type), the FICO score of the borrower at origination and the loan to value ratio of the loan at origination. Additionally, all estimations include fixed e↵ects for loan servicer D s , month of observation D m , year of observation D y , and year of origination
Our primary results are obtained using this DD framework; we estimate the impact of the shale boom on default (and mild default) using our propensity-score matched control group as described in Section 2.1. The estimated provides us with the change in default in treated areas relative to non-treated areas during the boom, while controlling for a number of loan specific covariates including the loan term, interest rate, and a number of other origination characteristics. We provide both geographically pooled estimated of this treatment e↵ect as well as conduct separate estimations for each treated shale area.
Next, we investigate if the expected reduction in default probability for the treatment group is concentrated in a subset of borrowers. We split our sample by credit scores and initial LTV ratios-two standard non-geographic measures of risk-and repeat our DD estimation. We first divide our full sample over four FICO credit score buckets: less than 620, 621 to 680, 681 to 739, and 740 or higher. Although there is no precise industry prescribed cut-o↵ for what is considered to be a subprime or prime loan, these buckets roughly correspond to subprime, near-prime, prime, and super-prime credit categories, respectively. Additionally, we repeat this test for di↵erent loan-to-value (LTV) buckets at the time of origination. We 19 Of course, the exact start time of the boom varies across shale plays. In the initial specification, we include 2007 as the start date for the shale boom, but we later present the year specific estimated treatment e↵ects by shale play (see Figure 4 and Figures A7-A12) . We end the analysis at the end of 2014 for two reasons. First, our mortgage data availability only extends through the end of 2014. Additionally, in 2015 global oil prices dropped significantly, and therefore the "bust" plausibly began some time during 2015. Therefore, 2007 to 2014 is the best general time period that can be considered the "boom" or "treatment" time period.
estimate our model for each of the following LTV categories: <=80%, 80-85%, 85-90%, 90%-95%, >95%. These results will provide an idea of the type of borrowers that are most sensitive to changes in the probability of default associated with economic booms. For both tests, we estimate the regression model described in Equation 2 for each risk bucket using the complete list of controls described in the base model.
Finally, we investigate the robustness of our main results by conducting a series of tests. First, we test the sensitivity of our results to alternative control groups by repeating the baseline DD estimation 20 times for each shale play, as well as the overall universe of treated areas, using a randomly selected control group from the nationwide sample of loans in lieu of the propensity score matched sample.
20 All of these results are estimated for both definitions of default. In addition, we employ two falsification tests. First, we implement a placebo treatment on randomly selected loans that are not located in areas impacted by the shale boom from our baseline control groups. Second, we repeat the placebo test, this time using the universe of treated loans and randomly assigning these loans to either the treatment or control group.
Next, we consider the exact timing of the treatment e↵ect by estimating the average di↵erence in default rates for the treated and control mortgages using Equation 3:
where again d i,c,t is the outcome of interest-mortgage default-for individual mortgage i in county c in month t. S Shalec is an indicator variable corresponding to counties with shale oil and/or gas activity (i.e. the treatment group) and is zero for the mortgages not located in one of the counties with shale activity and D Unlike the previous di↵erences-in-di↵erence estimation strategy, these coe cients simply show the estimated di↵erence in default rates in treated and control areas after controlling for all covariates by year. In the years prior to the shale boom, we expect these coe cient estimates to be relatively small in magnitude. Once the shale boom begins, we expect that these coe cient estimates will become larger in magnitude. This will provide evidence of when the boom began (and possibly ended), for both the entire sample and for each shale area separately. were about 8.0% less likely to have defaulted. While specific point estimates for mild default are slightly di↵erent in order of magnitude, these pattern is the same. Each of these 28 estimated marginal e↵ects are statistically significant at p=.01. These results show that of loans originated in the two years leading up to the boom, loans in shale counties had lower probabilities of later going into default compared to other mortgages in non-shale counties with similar origination characteristics and located in counties with a similar labor market size and average wages. Table 3 shows main results utilizing the full panel of data available with the propensity score matched control group for both default and mild default. For the overall sample, we estimate that the shale boom is associated with a 6.1% decrease in the probability of mortgages of default. In addition, each of the six areas experienced a statistically significant decrease in the probability of mortgages default with estimated marginal e↵ects ranging from 4.1% in Eagle Ford to 9.1% in Bakken. Similar results are observed for the less stringent 30+ day definition of default (i.e. mild default). Overall, mortgages in shale areas experience a 5.7% decrease in mild default, with point estimates in individual shale plays ranging from 4.4% in Marcellus to 9.3% in Bakken.
Results
The mortgage specific control variables perform largely as expected. In the 90+ days default specification, borrower creditworthiness, as measured by FICO credit scores at origination, is negatively associated with default. A 100 point increase in FICO score is associated with, on average, a 8.8% reduction in the probability of default. A one point increase in the initial interest rate of the loan is associated with, on average, a 2.2% increase in the probability of default. A 30 year or longer loan is associated with, on average a 2.7% increase in the probability of default. The estimates for initial leverage are positive, but only statistically significant in three of the seven specifications. As compared to fixed rate loans, adjustable rate mortgages on average are 6.7% more likely to default and 30 year mortgages are 2.7% more likely to default. These results are similar for the 30+ days definition of delinquency; in this specification the magnitude of the e↵ects for loan term and credit score is larger and the leverage variable is positive and statistically significant overall. Table 4 presents results pooled across all geographic areas subset by risk category. We find a significant negative treatment e↵ect for each of our four credit score categories. We find that the largest treatment e↵ect of a 9.3% reduction in default probability in the 681-739 credit score bucket, closely followed by a 8.3% reduction in default probability for the 621-680 credit score bucket. These middle credit buckets, corresponding roughly to the universe of near-prime and prime borrowers in our sample, have treatment e↵ects that are more than double those found in the lowest credit bin (-3.7%) and the highest credit bin (-4.0%). This result is intuitive; those with very high (low) credit scores have a low (high) probability of default, independent of local economic conditions; therefore the change in local economic conditions precipitated by the shale oil and gas boom has a relatively smaller marginal impact on their probability of default than those with average default risks.
Similarly, we find significant treatment e↵ects for each of our LTV categories. However, borrowers with high leverage experience relatively smaller reductions in the their default probabilities (3.6-4.9%) as compared to the 8.3% reduction in default probability those borrowers who purchased their homes with at least 20% equity (LTV<= 80). These results provide some insight into the relative impact of the shale boom for borrowers of di↵erent risk categories, but it's important to note across the spectrum of both metrics of borrower level risk we find that the shale boom has a consistent significant negative impact on the probability of default.
Next, we test the sensitivity of our results to alternative control groups by randomly choosing 20 control groups. Table 5 shows the results for default using 20 random control groups taken from nationally sample of loans. The process of generating a random control group is performed 20 times for each of the 6 shale plays as well as 20 times for the overall sample. For each of these iterations, we estimate a treatment e↵ect. Out of the 280 estimated treatment e↵ects whose estimates we present in Table 5 , all but one are negative and statistically significant at the p=.05 level and all but four are statistically significant at the p=.01 level. The average treatment e↵ect across all iterations for each play ranges from 6.2% in Niabrara to 14.9% in Bakken with an average treatment e↵ect of 8.5% in the sample pooling all 6 shale plays. Table 6 presents the same analysis for the mild default variable. These results are similar to the results for the 90+ days of delinquency specification. Overall, these results show that our main results is robust to many di↵erent selections of control groups. Table 7 shows the results from the first placebo test, that randomly assign loans in actually treated areas into either the treatment or control group. We expect to find no consistent e↵ect of this placebo treatment e↵ect on either default or mild default. Across the 14 regressions that span both default definitions and each shale play, eight of the estimated treatment e↵ects are negative while the remaining six are positive. None of these fourteen estimated treatment e↵ects are statistically significant. Finally, Table 8 provides an alternative placebo test. For this placebo test, we take all mortgages chosen with the propensity score match that are similar to mortgages in shale areas. We randomly assign half of these non-treated loans a placebo treatment, and keep the other half as the control group for this placebo test. These results provide further evidence that our main findings are not spurious; out of the 14 regressions, four are statistically significant and with two of the statistically significant treatment e↵ects as positive and two as negative. In total, nine of these placebo treatment e↵ects are positive with the other five negative. In sum, Tables 7 and 8 provide 28 placebo treatment e↵ects for default and mild default over each shale play separately as well as for the aggregated sample. In total, 13 of these are negative and the other 15 as positive. Table 9 shows a comparison of the estimated treatment e↵ects across all plays using alternative control groups. Using the propensity score matched control group, the estimated treatment e↵ect on mortgage default and mild default, is 6.1% and 5.6% respectively. Both of these estimates are actually conservative relative to the estimated treatment e↵ects simply using the randomly selected control groups. For default, these estimates range from 7.9% to 9.1%, compared to the propensity score match control group specification providing an estimated treatment e↵ect of 6.1%. This pattern is consistently observed across shale plays, with the exception of Niobrara which has very similar average treatment e↵ects using the propensity score match control group and the random control groups.
For all specifications up to this point, we have simplistically set the treatment time period starting in 2007 and extending until the end of 2014, the most recent date currently available in the data. But more realistically, the shale boom could have started, peaked, and declined in di↵erent shale plays at di↵erent points. Therefore, next we assess the timing of these e↵ects. Tables 10 and 11 show the marginal e↵ects associated with the coe cients 2003 , 2004 . . . 2014 estimated using equation 3 for both default and mild default. From 2003 to 2006, the shale areas have a slightly lower default rate after controlling for covariates between about 1% and 2%. But starting in 2007, the default rate in the shale areas begins to decline and reaches its peak in 2009, when the shale areas has a default rate almost 9% lower than the control area, implying a treatment e↵ect of about 7% to 8% at the boom's peak (subtracting out the pre-boom di↵erence between the groups). The default rates steadily begin to converge once again from 2010 to 2014. By 2014, the shale areas have less than a 4% di↵erence in default rates, down from the 9% di↵erence observed at the peak of the book in 2009. A similar pattern is observed for mild default. These coe cient estimates and p=.95 confidence intervals are illustrated in Figure 4 .
These results vary by geographic area. For example, in Table 10 , Haynesville, Marcellus, and Utica all reached a peak in the magnitude of their respective treatment e↵ects in 2009, and as of the end of sample period in 2014 the treatment e↵ect is no longer statistically significant in any of these these plays. On the other hand, Bakken, Eagle Ford and Niabrara still have large negative statistically significant treatment e↵ects through 2014. This not surprising, given that Haynesville, Marcellus, and Utica are primarily gas plays and gas prices began to fall in 2010, whereas Bakken, Eagle Ford, and Niabrara are primarily oil plays and oil prices did not begin to decline until mid-2015, after the end of our sample period.
Conclusion
The technological innovations that enabled shale oil and gas extraction provides a natural experiment that can be used to test the impact of a local labor market boom on a number of outcomes of interest. We examine the impact of this boom on mortgage payment activity on households who resided in these local areas before the shale production began. We find that the shale oil and gas boom lead to, on average, a 6% reduction on the probability of default. While point estimates vary, we estimate reductions in mortgage default in six di↵erent shale areas relative to plausible control groups.
These results are largest for near prime and prime borrowers and relatively lower for sub-prime and super-prime borrowers. These e↵ects are also largest for borrowers with more than 80 percent loan to value rations at origination.
The divergence in mortgage default rates begins in 2007, peaking in 2009, and coming back near convergence by 2014. Thus, there is a clear pattern showing the booms beginning, peak, and approaching the end that likely ended in mid-2015 with the significant drop in global oil prices.
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The implications of this research are multifaceted. First, economists are in general interested in how transitory shocks can impact savings behavior, which can have long term implications. We have shown that a labor market shock can impact mortgage default for households who purchased their home in the pre-shock period. While we only identify an example of how a positive labor market shock can decrease default, it is also plausible that a negative labor market shock can have a negative impact on mortgage payment behavior.
Results of this research can have long term implications for not only households that go into default, but also for society at large. The recent financial crisis is a somber reminder of this reality. It is important for policy makers to be able to (a) be aware of how these labor market shocks impact households' mortgage payment activity, (b) have a reasonable idea of the magnitude of these shocks (c) identify the type of borrowers that are most susceptible to these shocks. This paper provides a causal estimate of local labor market shocks on mortgage payment activity, and is unique in that we examine not just one labor market boom in one area, but instead six di↵erent booms in six di↵erent parts of the country that had di↵erent timings and magnitudes of these shocks. In addition, we identify the types of borrowers with varying sensitivities to these shocks.
There is still substantial room for future research in this area. While we identify a decrease in mortgage default associated with a plausibly exogenous labor market shock, we do not explore the specific channel that impacts mortgage default. It could be that workers with higher wages are less likely to miss a mortgage payment. It could also be that households located in these areas before the boom begins do not necessarily see increases in wages, but instead if they do find themselves in a situation where they have to miss mortgage payments, they can quickly sell the property for a gain instead of going into default. Thirdly, it could be that these booms cause decreases in the time it takes for job search. Thus, a homeowner who loses a job might be able to find a job more quickly, thus reducing mortgage default. Teasing out these e↵ects would require specific information on individual households in these areas in addition to the individual mortgage payment activity used in this study, and therefore is beyond the scope of this study.
In addition, it is currently unknown what will happen to default rates in these areas now that the boom has subsided. For instance, potentially individuals who received large pay increases might have purchased homes that, in the long run, they cannot a↵ord. Now that the boom has ended, these households might be particularly susceptible to default, and potentially foreclosure. With the recent drop in oil prices, this topic can be explored over the next several years.
Finally, this paper looks at aggregate e↵ects of a "boom town" on mortgage default. But there is still ample room for investigating how specific individuals in these towns have been impacted. For instance, is the decrease in default coming from households that get jobs in the lucrative oil and gas industry? Or is it that wages in general rise due to a labor demand shock and this reduces default for households across all industries?
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